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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Travis Denny, who was an inmate at the 
Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) at Fairton, New 
Jersey, challenges the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s 
(“DHO”) findings upheld by the District Court.  The DHO 
found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison 
regulation and sanctioned him with the forfeiture of forty 
days of good time credit and imposition of sixty days in 
disciplinary segregation.  During a search, prison officials 
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discovered homemade weapons hidden in Denny’s cell.  
Based solely on the presence of the weapons in his two-
inmate cell, Denny was sanctioned as set forth above.  He 
subsequently submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing, 
inter alia, that prison officials violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights by requiring him to forfeit the 
good time credits.  The District Court sua sponte dismissed 
the petition, and Denny appealed. 
 
I. Background 
The factual record in this appeal was not fully 
developed because the District Court acted sua sponte in 
dismissing the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 before the 
BOP had entered its appearance and before any discovery had 
taken place.  Accordingly, the record before this court is 
limited to the materials submitted by Denny with his habeas 
petition. 
 
Denny shared his cell with one other inmate.  During a 
routine search of the cell in March 2009, a corrections officer 
found a six and one-half inch long pointed weapon in the duct 
work of the vent above the sink between Denny’s cell and an 
adjacent cell.  “The shank appeared to be made out of fencing 
that had been straightened, it had a black electrical tape grip, 
a piece of white shoelace for a lanyard and a length of dental 
floss tied on to the lanyard.”  App. at 42.  Upon further 
inspection of the vent, the officer “noticed a false bottom in 
the duct made out of covers from file folders that had been 
cut and taped together to fit the length and width of the duct 
between [Denny’s cell and the adjacent cell].”  Id.  When the 
false bottom was removed, the officer found another 
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sharpened weapon similar to the first one.  The second 
weapon was seven inches long and was made out of fencing 
with a grip made out of electrical tape and a black shoelace 
lanyard attached.1
 
   
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Program Statement 
5270.07, Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, 
provides that it is an inmate’s responsibility to keep his or her 
area free of contraband.  See 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (2008).  
Relying upon that Program Statement, the DHO of FCI 
Fairton found that Denny had committed the prohibited act of 
“Possession of a Weapon,” in violation of BOP Code 104.2  
App. at 44.  The DHO sanctioned Denny with sixty days in 
disciplinary segregation and the forfeiture of forty days good 
time credit. 3
                                              
1 Denny asserts that the two weapons were also accessible to 
the inmates in the adjacent cell.  Appellees state, without 
support in the record, that there were two inmates in the 
adjacent cell who “possibly” had access to the area where the 
weapons were found.  Appellees’ Br. at 13.  According to 
Denny, however, the adjacent cell may have housed as many 
as three inmates.   
  According to Denny, both he and his cellmate 
2 At the time Denny was charged, BOP Code 104 prohibited 
the act of “[p]ossession, manufacture, or introduction of a 
gun, firearm, weapon, sharpened instrument, knife, dangerous 
chemical, explosive or any ammunition.”  See 28 C.F.R. 
541.13 (2008).  There are four categories of prohibited acts 
under BOP regulations:  Greatest, High, Moderate, and Low 
Moderate.  Code 104 is in the Greatest Severity Level 
Prohibited Acts category.   
3 The DHO’s written report is not part of the record in this 
case, and Appellees state that “Denny did not attach a 
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were charged with possession of a weapon, but the inmates in 
the adjacent cell, whom he posits may have had access to the 
weapons, were not charged.   
 
Denny appealed first to the BOP Regional Director 
and next to the National Inmate Appeals Administrator, both 
of whom denied the appeals.  The National Inmate Appeals 
Administrator wrote that “the greater weight of the evidence 
supports the decision, and the sanctions imposed were 
appropriate for the offense and in compliance with policy.”  
Id. at 46. 
 
Denny then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.  The District Court sua sponte dismissed the petition, 
stating that “it is clear that the findings of the [DHO] are 
supported by ‘some evidence,’ including the fact that the 
contraband weapons were found in the duct work of 
Petitioner’s assigned cell.”  Id. at 10.  Denny appealed to this 
court.  After he filed a pro se opening brief, this court 
appointed pro bono counsel to represent him.  Counsel 
subsequently filed opening and reply briefs on Denny’s 
behalf.4
                                                                                                     
complete copy of the Incident Report to the [habeas] petition, 
in which an additional statement made by him is recorded.”  
Appellees’ Br. at 4 n.3. 
 
4 Prior to the issuance of a briefing schedule, this court sua 
sponte consolidated this appeal with the factually similar 
appeal of Jose Hernandez-Zapata.  See Hernandez-Zapata v. 
Schultz, No. 11-2018.  Denny’s pro bono counsel acted as 
amicus counsel on behalf of Hernandez-Zapata in the 
consolidated appeals.  In December 2012, Appellees filed a 






The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and this court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  This court 
reviews a district court’s denial of federal habeas relief de 
novo but reviews its factual findings for clear error.  See Vega 
v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
Denny presents one claim:  that the DHO’s 
disallowance of good time credits violates his due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.5
                                                                                                     
Hernandez-Zapata had completed serving the custodial 
portion of his criminal sentence and had been released to 
United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement detention.  On February 8, 2013, 
Appellees informed this court that Hernandez-Zapata had 
been removed from the United States to Mexico.  Because 
Hernandez-Zapata has served the custodial portion of his 
criminal sentence and because he can suffer no collateral 
consequence or continuing injury from the loss of the forty 
days good time credit, we conclude that Hernandez-Zapata’s 
claim is now moot.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 
148 (3d Cir. 2009). 
  Federal prisoners 
serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year have a 
statutory right to receive credit toward their sentence for good 
conduct.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b); 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 
5 Denny does not argue that his due process rights were 
violated when the DHO required him to spend sixty days in 
disciplinary segregation nor does he argue that the DHO 
hearings were procedurally defective in any way. 
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(2008).  When such a statutorily created right exists, “a 
prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
good time credit.”  Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 
(1974)). 
 
In evaluating prisoners’ due process rights, the court 
must be sensitive to the “intricate balancing of prison 
management concerns with prisoners’ liberty.”  Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995).  “Mindful that internal 
security is a chief concern in prisons, the [Supreme] Court 
recognized that it would be impossible to prevent the 
introduction of weapons, drugs and other contraband into the 
premises if prisoners maintained a right of privacy in their 
cells.”  Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984)).  “In order to 
further the safe, secure, and orderly running of its 
institutions,” the BOP has specifically authorized “searches of 
inmates and of inmate housing and work areas to locate 
contraband and to deter its introduction and movement.”  28 
C.F.R. § 552.10 (2008). 
 
Notwithstanding the prison’s interest in ensuring 
safety and security, a prisoner’s interest in good time credits 
“entitle[s] him to those minimum procedures appropriate 
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process 
Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily 
abrogated.”  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.  “[R]evocation of good 
time does not comport with the minimum requirements of 
procedural due process unless the findings of the prison 





  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  As this court 
has clarified, the “some evidence” standard is a standard of 
appellate review to be applied by the district court rather than 
a burden of proof in a prison disciplinary proceeding.  See 
Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 399 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987). 
In Hill, a Massachusetts state prison guard opened a 
door to a walkway to find an inmate bleeding from the mouth 
and suffering from a swollen eye.  The guard observed three 
inmates jogging together down the walkway, away from the 
scene.  The guard “concluded that one or more of the three 
inmates had assaulted [the victim] and that they had acted as a 
group.”  Hill, 472 U.S. at 448.  Two of the inmates were 
found to have planned, aided, or participated in the assault, in 
violation of prison regulations, despite written statements 
from the victim that they had not caused his injuries.  Based 
solely upon the testimony and written statements of the guard, 
prison officials sanctioned each of the two inmates with the 
forfeiture of 100 days of good time credits as well as 15 days 
in isolation.  The Supreme Court upheld the deprivation of 
good time credits, noting that “[a]lthough the evidence in this 
                                              
6 Denny concedes that Hill’s “some evidence” standard 
applies to his claim but argues that “[r]evocation of an 
inmate’s good conduct time must be based on the greater 
weight of the evidence.”  Appellants’ Br. at 8-9.  According 
to BOP regulations, the DHO’s decision “shall be based on at 
least some facts, and if there is conflicting evidence, it must 
be based on the greater weight of the evidence.”  28 C.F.R. § 
541.17(f) (2008).  Denny, however, points to no conflicting 
evidence that would trigger the regulation’s greater weight of 
the evidence requirement. 
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case might be characterized as meager, and there was no 
direct evidence identifying any one of three inmates as the 
assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence that the 
findings of the disciplinary board were without support or 
otherwise arbitrary.”  Id. at 457.  
 
 The key question in this case is what limit the Due 
Process Clause places on the constructive possession theory 
in the prison context.  Denny argues that constructive 
possession in the prison context requires a showing of 
“dominion and control over the contraband, as well as 
knowledge of it.”  Appellants’ Br. at 9.  While it is true that 
this is the standard definition of constructive possession in 
this circuit, Denny does not cite a single case from this court 
or any other court applying this definition of constructive 
possession in the prison context.7
                                              
7 Judge Rendell asserts that “[i]t is axiomatic that constructive 
possession requires either the exercise of control or dominion, 
or the power and intention to exercise dominion or control, 
over property.”  Dissenting Op. of Rendell, J. at 1.  As with 
Denny, Judge Rendell does not cite any case applying this 
definition of constructive possession in the prison context.  
There are no such cases because to apply this standard of 
constructive possession in the prison context would place an 
unreasonably high burden on prison officials, given their 
significant interest in maintaining safety and security within 
the prison. 
  As noted above, the 
Supreme Court has held that a prison disciplinary decision 
need only be supported by “some evidence” in order to satisfy 
due process.  Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.  Though the “some 
evidence” standard is a standard of appellate review and not a 
burden of proof, see Brown, 819 F.2d at 399 n.4, a reviewing 
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court need only find that the DHO’s decision had “some basis 
in fact” in order to affirm the decision as comporting with the 
Due Process Clause.  Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. 
 
Courts that have considered this question have 
uniformly held that the discovery of contraband in a shared 
cell constitutes “some evidence” of possession sufficient to 
uphold a prison disciplinary sanction against each inmate in 
the cell, including depriving that inmate of his or her liberty 
interest in good time credits.  The Seventh Circuit, applying a 
probability-based approach, held that a twenty-five percent 
probability that contraband found in a four-person cell 
belonged to one of the inmates constituted “some evidence.”  
See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345-46 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“The proposition that constructive possession provides 
‘some evidence’ of guilt when contraband is found where 
only a few inmates have access is unproblematical.”).  More 
recently, the Eighth Circuit concluded that discovery of two 
homemade weapons found above the entry door to the 
common area of an eight-person cell constituted “some 
evidence” of possession.  See Flowers v. Anderson, 661 F.3d 
977, 980-81 (8th Cir. 2011) (relying on a collective 
responsibility theory whereby each inmate is collectively 
culpable for contraband found in a shared area). 
 
The BOP relies exclusively on a theory of collective 
responsibility to argue that the DHO’s findings and sanctions 
should be upheld.  “Through the judicially recognized 
adaptation of collective responsibility . . . the courts have 
been willing to accept the probabilities that an inmate has 
committed a sanctionable prohibited act when no direct 
evidence links him to it.”  Appellees’ Br. at 8.  The BOP 
further asserts that “[i]ncarcerated inmates are often violent 
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people with demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal 
conduct.  Having stripped them of virtually every means of 
self-protection and outside aid, the BOP is not free to let the 
state of nature take its course.”  Id. at 8-9. 
 
Not only has the Eighth Circuit endorsed the 
application of collective responsibility, see Flowers, 661 F.3d 
at 980-81, but a judge of the Seventh Circuit has also 
suggested that he would subscribe to the collective 
responsibility theory.  See Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 347 (stating 
that “purely collective guilt” might be deemed to satisfy due 
process in the prison context) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 
The application of collective responsibility in the 
prison context has its foundation in BOP Program Statement 
5270.07, Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, which 
provides that it is an inmate’s responsibility to keep his or her 
area free of contraband.  See 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (2008).  
Although the BOP Program Statement does not define the 
term “area,” a prisoner’s area at a minimum includes the 
prisoner’s cell as well as any other space accessible from 
within the cell.  In a shared cell, all parts of the cell are 
equally accessible to each prisoner housed in the cell.  Thus, 
each individual prisoner is responsible for keeping the entire 
cell free from contraband.  Because each prisoner in a shared 
cell has an affirmative responsibility to keep the entire cell, 
and all other space accessible from within the cell, free from 
contraband, it follows that any contraband found within the 
cell is constructively possessed by each of the inmates housed 
in that cell.  Thus, the mere discovery of contraband in a 
shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in 




Judge Rendell suggests that “this reasoning would 
allow prison officials to ignore the clear dictates of Hill, and 
be held to a lesser–indeed, unrelated–standard, i.e., collective 
guilt, as a substitute for the ‘some evidence’ of possession 
requirement.”  Dissenting Op. of Rendell, J. at 4.  She further 
asserts that “[t]he offense of ‘possession’ (just like ‘killing’ 
and ‘assault’) is no different in the prison context than outside 
that context.”  Id.  Contrary to Judge Rendell’s mistaken 
understanding of Hill, the “some evidence” standard of 
appellate review dramatically reduces the amount of evidence 
required for an inmate to be held responsible for offenses 
such as killing, assault, and possession of a weapon.  In Hill, 
prison officials found two inmates responsible for assaulting 
another prisoner and deprived them each of 100 days of good 
time credits based solely on the testimony of a guard who 
observed them and a third prisoner leaving the scene.  Such 
evidence would never be enough to find a defendant guilty of 
assault in a regular criminal courtroom, yet the Supreme 
Court held that it was sufficient to satisfy the Due Process 
Clause. 
 
Furthermore, though the term collective responsibility 
or collective guilt does not appear in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Hill, in that case the Court implicitly endorses the 
application of collective responsibility to facts such as those 
at issue here.  Three inmates were observed leaving the scene 
of an assault in Hill, and two of those inmates were held 
responsible.  In the absence of evidence directly linking any 
one of the inmates to the assault, the Supreme Court upheld 
the prison’s sanctioning of two of those inmates as being not 
“without support or otherwise arbitrary.”  Hill, 472 U.S. at 
457.  In this case, two inmates shared a cell in which two 
homemade shanks were found, and one of those inmates, 
13 
 
Denny, was sanctioned for possession of a weapon.  The 
weapons may have belonged to Denny’s cellmate, but in 
accordance with Hill, prison officials did not violate Denny’s 
due process rights when they deprived him of his good time 
credits.  Prison officials here had as evidence not only the 
presence of the weapons in a two-inmate cell but also the 
affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were clearly 
on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from 
contraband.8
 
  The evidence in this case, therefore, is more 
substantial than the evidence presented against the inmates in 
Hill. 
We are not oblivious to the realities of prison life that 
might make it difficult or even dangerous for prisoners in 
shared cells to be affirmatively responsible for policing the 
illicit activities of their cellmates.  Nonetheless, the Due 
Process Clause requires us to balance a prisoner’s liberty 
interest in good time credits against the prison’s interest in 
                                              
8 Judge Rendell states in a footnote that “[i]f possession in the 
prison context embraces collective responsibility, as the 
majority contends, then any cellmate of a prisoner who is 
authorized to take medication would impermissibly be in 
‘possession’ of another prisoner’s medication by virtue of its 
presence in their shared cell.”  Dissenting Op. of Rendell, J. at 
4 n.7.  Assuming, as Judge Rendell does in her hypothetical, 
that one of the prisoners is authorized to take the medication 
in question, the medication would not be contraband, and the 
prisoner’s cellmate would have no affirmative responsibility 
to keep the cell free from such authorized medication.  Thus, 
under this court’s opinion, the cellmate would not be 
impermissibly in “possession” of the medication simply 
because of its presence in the cell. 
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maintaining a safe and secure environment.  See Sandin, 515 
U.S. at 478.  Assaults by inmates on both staff and other 
inmates are a major problem facing the federal prison system.  
From January to May 2012, there were approximately 215 
serious assaults by inmates on other inmates and twelve 
serious assaults by inmates on prison staff.  See Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, Assault Graphs, available at 
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/assaults/assaults.
jsp (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).  For the same time period, 
there were over 1,000 less serious assaults by inmates on 
other inmates as well as nearly 700 less serious assaults by 
inmates on prison staff.9
 
  Id.  Prison safety concerns are 
particularly acute where, as here, the contraband consisted of 
weapons that even Denny’s counsel conceded were 
potentially lethal.   
In the case before us, it is undisputed that two 
homemade shanks were found in a space accessible from 
within Denny’s cell.  This evidence, by itself, constitutes 
“some evidence” that Denny possessed the weapons in 
question.  Furthermore, and as noted herein, both the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits have held inmates responsible for 
possession of contraband under circumstances similar to those 
                                              
9 Under BOP regulations, an inmate commits a Code 101 
serious assault for “[a]ssaulting any person, or [for] an armed 
assault on the institution’s perimeter (a charge for assaulting 
any person at this level is to be used only when serious 
physical injury has been attempted or accomplished).”  28 
C.F.R. § 541.3(b), Table 1 (2012).  An inmate commits a 
Code 224 less serious assault “when less serious physical 
injury or contact has been attempted or accomplished by an 
inmate.”  Id. 
15 
 
present here.  We see no reason to diverge from these courts.  
It follows that the DHO did not violate Denny’s due process 
rights when it found that he had committed the prohibited act 
of “Possession of a Weapon,” in violation of BOP Code 104, 
and sanctioned him with the forfeiture of forty days good 
time credit. 
 
 III. Conclusion 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court
1 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The Supreme Court has recognized for over three decades that prison 
inmates have a fundamental liberty interest in good-time credits, which is 
protected by the mantle of the Due Process Clause.  See Superintendent v. Hill, 
472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).  An 
inmate cannot be deprived of good-time credits for a transgression unless the 
prison official’s findings are supported by “some evidence” in the record, “some 
basis in fact.”  Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.   
 
The majority opinion acknowledges that “some evidence” is our standard of 
review, and that possession of a weapon—here, constructive possession—is the 
offense that must be established.  It is axiomatic that constructive possession 
requires either the exercise of control or dominion, or the power and intention to 
exercise dominion or control, over property.1  Where, as here, the items in 
question were not in plain view, and the accused did not exclusively occupy the 
premises, there is no inference of the power and intention to exercise dominion or 
control, and some other factual support for the accused’s connection to the item is 
required.2
                                              
1See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing 
that under federal criminal law, “[c]onstructive possession necessarily requires 
both ‘dominion and control’ over an object and knowledge of that object’s 
existence”) (quoting United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993)); 1A 
Kevin O’Malley, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Criminal § 16:05 (6th ed. 
2006) (“A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the 
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a 
thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive 
possession of it.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1282 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the term 
as the fact of having  “[c]ontrol or dominion over a property without actual 
possession or custody of it”).  The majority suggests that these authorities are not 
controlling because they do not apply to the prison context, but I cannot imagine 
that the Prohibited Acts listed by the prison (see infra p. 2) are somehow to be 
defined differently than they are defined as a matter of law; that, too, would have 
due process implications, as I discuss below.  
  Thus, as a reviewing court, we can affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
 
2Courts generally have held that when a defendant “was not in exclusive 
possession of the premises, it may not be inferred that he knew of the presence of 
the [hidden contraband] and had control over them, unless there are other 
incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such an inference.” 
United States v. Bonham, 477 F.2d 1137, 1139 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (quoting 
Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1958)); see also United States 
v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a similar approach and 
2 
of Travis Denny’s petition for habeas corpus only if the alleged facts provided 
“some basis in fact” that supported the prison officials’ determination that the 
inmate actually exercised or intended to exercise dominion or control over the 
shanks in question.3
 
  However, relying on an unrelated section of the prison 
regulations, and substituting “collective responsibility” for individual guilt, the 
majority opinion sidesteps this standard of review, and sanctions the deprivation of 
Denny’s due process without any evidence to support the determination that he 
“possessed” the shanks in question. 
“Possession” of a weapon is an offense listed under Code 104 of the federal 
prison regulations, along with over 80 other offenses, including: 
 
Code Prohibited acts 
. . . 
100 Killing 
101 Assaulting any person (includes sexual assault) or an armed 
assault on the institution’s secure perimeter (a charge for 
assaulting any person at this level is to be used only when 
serious physical injury has been attempted or carried out by 
an inmate) 
102 Escape from escort; escape from a secure institution (low, 
medium, and high security level and administrative 
institutions); or escape from a minimum institution with 
violence 
103 Setting a fire (charged with this act in this category only 
when found to pose a threat to life or a threat of serious 
bodily harm or in furtherance of a prohibited act of Greatest 
Severity . . .) 
104 Possession, manufacture, or introduction of a gun, firearm, 
weapon, sharpened instrument, knife, dangerous chemical, 
explosive or any ammunition 
                                                                                                                                       
recognizing it is consistent with the reasoning of sister courts of the Third, Fifth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits).  
 
3Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a district court may dismiss a habeas corpus petition 
without an evidentiary hearing if it plainly appears from the face of the petition 
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.  See Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 
284, 291 (3d Cir. 1991). In reviewing such a decision, we are effectively in the 
position of the district court, and undertake a two-step inquiry, which requires us 
to determine:  (1) whether the petitioner has alleged facts that would suggest he is 
entitled to relief, and if so, (2) whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to 
establish the truth of those allegations.  Id. at 291 & n.5.   
3 
105 Rioting 
106 Encouraging others to riot 
 
  * * * 
 
28 C.F.R. § 541.13 tbl. 3 (2008).  Under Superintendent v. Hill, in order for Denny 
to have been deprived of good-time credits based upon “possession” of a weapon, 
there must have been some evidence in the record, i.e., some basis in fact, to 
support the prison officials’ determination that he exercised, or intended to 
exercise, dominion or control over the shanks.  On the record before us, there is no 
such evidence—none, not just less than “some evidence.”4
 
 
According to the record, the two shanks were found in an area that Denny 
did not occupy or exclusively enjoy.  The shanks were found in a duct, spanning 
the distance between his cell and another cell, which was situated behind a vent 
located above the sink in the cell Denny shared with his cellmate.  There were no 
other indicia to suggest that Denny had any connection or nexus to the shanks that 
would suggest dominion or control.   
 
Had the items in question been attached to Denny’s locker or bed, or even 
in plain view, there may have been a basis in fact for concluding that he possessed 
them.  A permissible inference of actual exercise of dominion or control, or power 
and intent to do so, could have been drawn from such facts and there would then 
be “some evidence” of constructive possession.  See note 2, supra.  In Hill, the 
security guard heard a scuffle and upon immediate investigation saw the three 
inmates leaving the scene of the assault, which—importantly—occurred in an 
enclosed walkway, where no other individuals, except the victim, were present in 
the area.  472 U.S. at 456.5
                                              
4It is interesting to note that evidence of de minimis probative value, i.e., any 
evidence that would faintly tend to make an inmate’s guilt more probable, does not 
constitute “some evidence” under this standard of review.  See, e.g., Zavaro v. 
Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that prison guard 
statements that “every inmate” participated in a riot were not plausible and thus 
could not constitute “some evidence” of an inmate’s participation when the inmate 
was one of a hundred inmates in a large mess hall); see also Gerald L. Neuman, 
The Constitutional Requirement of ‘Some Evidence,’ 25 San Diego L. Rev. 631, 
662-63, 678 (1988) (explaining why the term “some evidence” “cannot be taken 
literally—the smallest quantum of relevant evidence will not suffice”). 
  These facts led to the prison officials’ determination 
 
5This is a key fact (one that the majority omits) that clearly provides, in the form 
of circumstantial evidence, “some evidence” to support the prison officials’ 
determination that the three inmates committed the assault in Hill. 
4 
that the three prisoners were the perpetrators, and the Supreme Court held that 
these facts satisfied the “some evidence” test on review.  Id.  By contrast, there are 
no facts that support the determination that Denny exercised, or intended to 
exercise, dominion or control over the weapons. 
 
  Instead of addressing this issue, the majority opinion takes us on a detour 
to an unrelated provision of the prison regulations that contains twenty-two rights 
and responsibilities of prisoners.  One of these responsibilities advises: 
 
It is your responsibility not to waste food, to follow the laundry and 
shower schedule, to maintain neat and clean living quarters, to keep 
your area free of contraband, and to seek medical and dental care as 
you may need it. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (emphasis added).6
 
  This, the majority opinion urges, provides 
for “collective responsibility,” such that inmates are collectively responsible for 
contraband if their “areas” are not “free” of such contraband.  Thus, the majority 
opinion reasons, Denny can be deprived of good-time credits for “possessing” the 
shanks in question because all of the inmates in his “area” are collectively 
responsible.  However, this reasoning would allow prison officials to ignore the 
clear dictates of Hill, and be held to a lesser—indeed, unrelated—standard, i.e., 
collective guilt, as a substitute for the “some evidence” of possession requirement.  
This cannot be. 
Had the prison officials desired to define “possession” in some broader 
manner so as to sweep in an inmate’s association with any article found in or near 
his cell, they could have done so.  Similarly, they could have dictated that non-
adherence to “responsibilities” could result in loss of good-time credits.  But they 
have done neither.  Instead, they have prohibited “possession,” which would 
appear—like killing, assault, and the other listed offenses—to require evidence 
probative of the inmate’s commission of the offense in question.  There is no basis 
for ascribing vague concepts of collective responsibility onto the legal meaning of 
“possession” when a prisoner is the offender.  The offense of “possession” (just 
like “killing” or “assaulting”) is no different in the prison context than outside that 
context.7
                                              
6The regulations do not attach any sanction for an inmate’s failure to adhere to this 
responsibility or any of the other delineated responsibilities. 
  
 
7Other sections of the prison regulations buttress the conclusion that no such 
difference exists, as demonstrated by examining other “possession” offenses listed 
as Prohibited Acts.  One such offense, for example, is “[p]ossession of any  . . . 
drugs . . . not prescribed for the individual by the medical staff” is a prohibited act 
5 
To the extent that the majority opinion adopts the view that the standard for 
“possession” is somehow different in prison, it ignores the fact that the regulations 
fail to give inmates notice of this alternative standard.  Although our Court has 
“reject[ed] the view that the degree of specificity required of such regulations is as 
strict in every instance as that required of ordinary criminal sanctions,” we 
nonetheless have recognized that “[d]ue process undoubtedly requires certain 
minimal standards of specificity in prison regulations.”  Meyers v. Aldredge, 492 
F.2d 296, 310 (1974).   
 
To say, as the majority opinion does, that all of the inmates share 
responsibility is not the same as saying that there is “evidence” that a particular 
inmate “possessed” the weapon.8  Courts that have said otherwise are just plain 
wrong.9
 
  Adopting such reasoning endorses the exact arbitrary deprivation of 
good-time credits that Hill proscribed.   472 U.S. at 455. 
The majority opinion urges that it is our job to “balance” a prisoner’s 
liberty interest against the interest of the prison in maintaining the safety and 
security of inmates and prison staff.  But in Hill, the Supreme Court settled upon 
the “some evidence” standard, a standard of review that is admittedly deferential 
to the prison authorities, so as to achieve the necessary balance between an 
                                                                                                                                       
under Code 113.  28 C.F.R. § 541.13 tbl. 3.  Possession by the inmate for whom 
the medicine is prescribed is permitted, but as to that inmate’s cellmate, it 
constitutes contraband since “contraband” is defined as, inter alia, “material 
prohibited by law, or by regulation,” 28 C.F.R. § 500.1, and the regulation 
prohibits possessing medication that was “not prescribed for the individual.”  If 
possession in the prison context embraces collective responsibility, as the majority 
contends, then any cellmate of a prisoner who is authorized to take medication 
would impermissibly be in “possession” of another prisoner’s medication by virtue 
of its presence in their shared cell. 
 
8One case upon which the majority relies to support its position that “collective 
responsibility” can constitute “some evidence” is Flowers v. Anderson, 661 F.3d 
977 (8th Cir. 2011).  This case, however, is distinguishable because the inmates 
there did “not contest the general proposition that an inmate’s failure to keep his 
living area free of contraband may constitute some evidence of a violation when 
contraband is found in that area”—which is the centrally disputed issue in this 
appeal.  Id. at 981. 
 
9Similarly, a probability-based approach to possession is also flawed.   See, e.g., 
Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1992).  It is essentially akin 
to speculation; probabilities alone are not “some evidence.”  See note 4, supra.   
 
6 
inmate’s interests and a prison’s interests.  See id. (“Requiring a modicum of 
evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent 
arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue 
administrative burdens.”); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560-71 (recognizing that 
consideration of what minimum procedures due process requires in prison 
disciplinary proceedings, e.g., advance written notice of the alleged violation or a 
written statement of findings, necessitates balancing “the inmate’s interest in 
avoiding loss of good time against the needs of the prison”).  That balance has 
been struck; the majority’s analysis essentially dilutes the “some evidence” 
standard, effectively resetting the balance in favor of the prison and against the 
inmate.  That is uncalled for.       
 
   I, thus, respectfully dissent from the majority’s view that Denny has failed 
to set forth a constitutional violation in his petition for habeas corpus relief.  When 
viewed in the light most favorable to him, the petition clearly reveals that the 
prison officials’ determination that Denny possessed weapons is not supported by 
“some basis in fact,” so as to support the denial of good-time credits.  This is 
sufficient to bar dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 2243.  I would accordingly vacate the 
District Court’s dismissal order.    
